Deep neural networks are highly vulnerable to adversarial examples, which imposes severe security issues for these state-of-the-art models. Many defense methods have been proposed to mitigate this problem. However, a lot of them depend on modification or additional training of the target model. In this work, we analytically investigate each layer's representation of non-perturbed and perturbed images and show the effect of perturbations on each of these representations. Accordingly, a method based on whitening coloring transform is proposed in order to diminish the misrepresentation of any desirable layer caused by adversaries. Our method can be applied to any layer of any arbitrary model without the need of any modification or additional training. Due to the fact that full whitening of the layer's representation is not easily differentiable[1], our proposed method is superbly robust against white-box attacks. Furthermore, we demonstrate the strength of our method against some state-of-the-art black-box attacks such as Carlini-Wagner L 2 attack[2] and we show that our method is able to defend against some non-constrained(L ∞ = ∞) attacks.
Introduction
Deep neural networks have achieved significant success in a wide variety of challenging applications from object and face detection ( [3] , [4] , [5] ) to speech processing ( [6] , [7] ), and from autonomous cars ( [8] ) to medical image analysis [9] , [10] . However, it is shown that these models are highly vulnerable to adversarial perturbations [11, 12] . Adversarial attacks are considered severe security threats as demonstrated against Google Cloud Vision [13] , or autonomous cars [8] . Due to their vast domain of application, it is crucial to study the security of these models.
Adversarial attacks are generated by adding perturbations to an image in order to mislead the target model while the difference between clean and perturbed image is imperceptible to a human observer. Due to the transferability of adversarial attacks [14] , crafted adversaries for one model can be effectively used against other models. So black-box attacks are considered a severe security issue against many practical real-world applications since they can lead to catastrophic consequences in applications like medical image analysis [15] and self-driving cars [8] where the attacker might not have full access to parameters of the models. The vulnerability of machine learning models against adversarial attacks has attracted considerable attention for a long time [16] , [17] . Wide variety of machine learning models have been studied such as, Decision Trees [18] , Support Vector Machines [19] and Neural Networks [11] , [12] . arXiv:1907.01023v1 [cs.CV] 1 Jul 2019 Figure 1 : The intuition behind our proposed method. We refine the feature representations of DNNs' hidden layers in order to diminish the unfavorable effects of adversarial perturbations. In order to do so, we use WCT to change the channel correlations of the adversarial example's representation in deep layers of the network.
Generating adversarial examples to mislead the classifier during the test phase has been investigated extensively. As a method to evaluate the effectiveness of different attacks, some constraints have been introduced to limit the additional perturbation (e.g. limiting L 2 or L ∞ norm of the perturbations not to exceed some small value ). Generally, adversarial attacks lay into two categories: white-box and black-box attacks. In white-box attacks, the attacker has full access to the parameters of model and uses the gradients of the model in order to generate perturbations capable of fooling the target model [12] , [11] , [20] , [21] , [2] , [22] . In black-box attacks our access to the target model is limited, we just have access to its inputs and output scores [23] , [24] .
Many different defense methods are designated to diminish this phenomenon. These methods include adversarial training ( [11] , [12] ), pre-processing ( [25] , [26] ), noise reduction [27] , and using deep models ( [28] , [29] , [30] ). Although defense methods based on modification of deep neural networks are effective against black-box adversarial attacks, they are still vulnerable against white-box attacks. As well as this, adversarial training is shown to be effective against adversarial examples at which a number of adversaries are injected into the training data. In order to make our model robust using adversarial training, we need to retrain the model. Moreover, finding appropriate adversarial examples itself is a complex challenge [21] . In spite of all of that, many of the aforementioned methods are proved to fail against adversarial attacks [31, 32] .
Several defense methods put their focus on defending against white-box attacks. One category of these methods tries to deny the attacker access to use gradients. In these defenses, a distortion in the gradients is introduced, making the white-box attacks less effective, but the decision boundary remains intact after the adversarial training [33] . These defense strategies typically result in a model that is very smooth in specific directions and neighborhoods of training points, which makes it harder for the attacker to find gradients indicating good candidate directions to perturb the input. However, as Athalye [32] discussed, the model does not become more robust; It just gives a false sense of security since it is still completely open to black-box attacks. Another group of defense methods, with a focus on defending white-box attacks, perform some transformation on the input data in order to remove perturbations [34] . They not only deny the attacker access to easy gradients but are also effectively robust against black-box attacks. Moreover, they do not impose any additional training on the model.
In this work, we investigate the transformation of layers' feature representations, refining them in order to remove the effects of perturbations from the latent representations, as a method of defense against both white and black-box attacks. To the best of our knowledge, the aforementioned problem has never been investigated from this perspective. Specifically, we propose the use of whitening coloring transform, as a method of representation refinement, in order to defend against adversarial examples.
We begin with an analysis on the effect of adversarial perturbations on each layer's learned feature representation in DNNs where we use nearest-neighbor algorithm to evaluate the deviation of the perturbed sample from its correct class and we show that the image gets deeper, it strays further from its correct class. This motivated us to come up with a method to refine feature representation in order to alleviate the effect of adversarial attacks. Our method is model-agnostic and can be applied to any application. Since full whitening of any layer's input is not easily differentiable [1] , our proposed method is robust against white-box attacks. As well as this, the effectiveness of our method against black-box attacks is demonstrated by reporting the results of our method against some state of the art attacks. For some attacks, such as PGD [35] , our method is still effective even when there is no constraint for the attacker (L ∞ = ∞) which shows the effectiveness of our method undoubtedly, and to the best of our knowledge, this is the first method to be able to handle non-constrained attacks.
To summarize, our work tackles the problem of adversarial perturbation in DNNs and presents an effective approach to mitigate the aforementioned problem. The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We analyze the impact of perturbations on feature representation of different layers in DNNs.
We illustrate that as the input flows through the network, there will be a gradual shift of feature representation towards the incorrect classes. • Inspired by our analysis, we propose a novel defense method to refine feature representation of DNN's hidden layers. We show that one can refine the adversarial examples' representation by whitening coloring transform and consequently, diminish the effect of adversarial perturbations drastically. • Through extensive experiments, we prove the validity of our analysis and proposed method using some state-of-the-art black-box and white-box adversarial attacks.
Analysis on Learned Feature Representation
In this section, we analyze the impact of adversarial attacks on the feature representation of shallow and deep layers of neural networks. This analysis will be used as a basis for the next section in which we represent our method.
Deep neural networks learn a hierarchical set of representations and as the input flows through, the learned feature representation grows progressively abstract and each class's representation gets further from the others for the sake of classification. In the presence of an adversary, as the image goes deeper into the network, its corresponding feature representation seems to deviate from its correct class, constantly. At the classification layer, the deviation from the correct class seems to be enlargened enormously, throwing the model into confusion and resulting in misclassification; Hence, we focus our analysis on scrutinizing the internal representations of clean and perturbed data.
In Fig. 2 , we use t-SNE algorithm [36] to visualize the distance between the corresponding feature representations of each class. As it represents, the adversarial examples are within the incorrect classes in deep layers of the neural network. To analyze this more accurately, we use the nearestneighbor algorithm on those layers and report its accuracy in Table 1 . As the adversaries get deeper into the network, their corresponding nearest-neighbor algorithm's accuracy decreases, from which one can understand that these samples are getting further away from their correct class's samples. As a consequence, adversarial examples would have representations closer to incorrect classes at the classification layer, since the misrepresentation accumulates at this layer, resulting in getting misclassified by the network.
In the following section, a novel method is proposed so as to alleviate any target layer's misrepresentation. In section 4, we demonstrate the significant impact of our method on the aforementioned misrepresentation by calculating nearest-neighbor accuracies of the refined feature representations.
Proposed Method
In the previous section, we have shown that the understanding of neural nets is extremely vulnerable to adversarial perturbation and shown that it is because of the fact that their layers misrepresent the adversaries. Also, we demonstrated that, in case of perturbations, this misrepresentation aggregates layer by layer, meaning that model's representation of the image strays further from the image's correct class in deeper layers of DNNs. Studying adversarial perturbations from this perspective has brought us the idea of refining their latent representation in order to defend against such adversaries.
In what follows, we will explain the Whitening Coloring Transform(WCT) in depth and define several useful notations (section 3.1). Thereupon, we will expound our novel method of refining the layers' representation in detail (section 3.2).
Whitening Coloring Transform and Notations
Consider an arbitrary multivariate Gaussian random vector X with arbitrary mean and covariance matrix, and Y , a desirable multivariate Gaussian random vector with some proper mean and covariance matrix. WCT is the process at which the mean and covariance of Y are imposed onto X using two transformations details of which are as follows.
Whitening is the transformation of a target random vector X, to another random vector W with unit diagonal covariance matrix meaning that the components of our new random vector are uncorrelated and have variances equal to 1 (this transformation is referred to as "whitening" since the output resembles a white noise). Coloring is somehow the inverse of whitening where the desirable mean and covariance matrix are imposed to W .
Before whitening and coloring, both X and Y are centered by subtracting their mean vectors m x and m y respectively. Now consider the eigen-decompositions of covariance matrices of X and Y
where Λ is a diagonal matrix with eigenvalues of Σ and Φ is the matrix of corresponding orthonormal eigenvectors such that Φ −1 = Φ T . Now X is transformed so as to obtain W which is the uncorrelated version of X
where Λ x Φ T x decorrelates X to have a covariance matrix equal to the identity matrix. Φ x maps W to the same space as X since the coordinate system has been changed after transforming X with Φ T x , and has no effect on the covariance matrix.
Then, the coloring transform is performed on the acquired W : y imposes the desired covariance matrix. Again, Φ T y just assures that X ends up in the same space as W since the coordinate system will be transformed by Φ y later on and it has no effect on the covariance of X as well. Finally, the desired mean vector m y will be added to the transformed representation. So now X , a multivariate Gaussian random vector, is obtained which has contents of X, with our desired mean and covariance matrix.
Here, we define several useful notations. Let I p and I c denote an adversarial example and its corresponding clean image, respectively. L(I) denotes correct class label of an image I and let φ k be the mapping from the image to its internal DNN representation at layer k where φ 0 means the image itself. Also, consider Γ(φ k (I)) as the image's corresponding to nearest-neighbor of φ k (I).
Feature Representation Refinement
As we have debated, adversarial perturbation has an immense negative effect on layers' feature representations. This makes the neural network misunderstand the image leading to incorrect decision-making. Here we propose a method to refine the layers' representations, as a method of defense against adversarial examples. We perform WCT on the target layer's representation of the image (φ k (I)), in order to refine its features to one that is semantically in close vicinity of its true class (L(I)). To be precise, in order to refine an adversarial example's representation we do the following.
For a desirable layer k and an adversary I p , first, layer k's feature representation of I p is whitened(using eq.3.1) such that the channels of transformed φ k (I p ) are uncorrelated to each other and have variances of 1:
where W p has the same dimension and is in the same space as I p but its channels no longer have any correlation to each other. Table 5 represents several whitened adversarial examples. As we can see, the contents, pixels representing the most important features, are preserved while the noise is dropped tremendously.
At this point, we may perform coloring and we would like to enforce a desirable correlation to the channels of W p for which the layer k's representation of an image I y is needed. An optimal choice for I y is to choose its corresponding clean image (I c ) which is obviously impractical. A second optimal choice can be a random clean image whose label is the same as that of the adversary (L(I p )) which as well is clearly nonviable ( Table 4 shows how different images for I y affect the network). We found that a good candidate for I y can be the nearest-neighbor of I p in some fraction of the train-set (even better than a random image with correct label which shows that our model is not dependant on nearest-neighbor's accuracy ( Table 1 )) meaning that:
where we choose j = 0, the nearest-neighbor in the image space, for most of our experiments since it is more beneficial in terms of both computation and accuracy since the adversaries have stronger effects on deeper layers, as stated in section 2). Now, after the calculation of I y , we impose φ k (I y )'s Table 3 : The effect of using our refinement on different layers of the network. Each row shows which layer we have put the WCT on and each column shows the nearest-neighbor's accuracy on different layers' representations. Since refining any layer's representation only affects the deeper representation, it has no effect on nearest-neighbor's accuracy of shallower layers. First row shows the accuracies on the vanilla network and last column shows the accuracy of the whole model. channels' correlations to the channels of W such that the new features of layer k, φ k (I p ), have the same content as φ k (I p ) but with channel correlation of φ k (I y ). In Table 5 , the reconstructions of φ k (I p ) for some adversarial examples are illustrated. As one can spot, the global structures and contents are maintained while the noise has been annihilated perfectly (even in case of PGD attack with L ∞ constraint of 0.8).
The new features (φ k (I p )) are then propagated through the rest of the network. Noticeably, our method can be applied to any number of layers simultaneously. In Fig. 3 we show the effectiveness of our method using t-SNE visualization.
Experiments and Results
In this section, an evaluation of our proposed method against some state-of-the-art attacks is represented. We conduct our experiment on three publicly available datasets namely MNIST [37] , Fashion-MNIST [38] , and Letters [39] . We picked four popular and effective attack algorithms: FGSM [12] , BIM [40] , PGD [35] , and CW [2] with different distortions for evaluation of our defense method against black-box attacks ( Table 2 ). The attacks' subscripts denote the L ∞ constraint imposed onto them except for CW whose subscript denotes the standard L 2 Carlini-Wagner attack [2] . Based on Table 3 , we demonstrate the proficiency of our method on feature representation refinement and compare its effect when used in different layers. As we have discussed in section 2, in the presence of adversaries, the nearest-neighbor's accuracy diminishes at deeper layers of the neural network. As we can see, the layer's representation improves after WCT, considerably. This is due to the fact that deeper layers' representations are more sparse and their values have stronger correlations to each other. Therefore, imposing correct correlations to a perturbed sample at these layers will have a higher reward. Also, performing the transform on all layers of the network has a considerable effect on the feature representation refinement of every layer and subsequently the accuracy of the model. We suggest using WCT on later layers if multiple WCTs is not possible since performing the transformation on deep layers has acceptable performance and much less computational overhead. Table 5 presents a comparison on the effectiveness of choosing WCT's clean image I y (using nearestneighbor algorithm) from different layers of the model in order to find an appropriate mean and covariance. It is shown that the best practical choice for I y is the nearest-neighbor of the adversary in the image space. Likewise, choosing the clean image from shallower layers, or even the image space, has much better performance since adversarial attacks have huge impact on the representation of deeper layers. This stems from the fact that the misrepresentation caused by adversarial perturbations accumulates at later layers, as discussed in 2.
Our method is evaluated against a range of adversaries where I y is chosen to be the nearest-neighbor sample in the image space. Our results are illustrated in Table 2 . The effectiveness of our method is evaluated on different layers (and all of the layers) of VGG16 classifier. Fig.4 represents the effectiveness of our method against different L ∞ distance constraints. As it is demonstrated, our defense method is nearly robust against even non-constrained PGD attack. Table 4 illustrates different stages of our refinement method on several datasets and attack algorithms. After whitening transform the content is preserved while the noise is reduced significantly. The reconstruction of the refined representation shows that WCT obliterates the additional perturbations resulting in denoised versions of the adversarial examples. Figure 4 : The effectiveness of our method against different attack constraints.
Conclusion and Future Works
In this work, we studied the effect of adversarial perturbations on feature representations of hidden layers and we proposed a novel method to tackle this problem. Our method tries to refine the adversaries' latent representations and is independent of any modification or additional training of the model. Moreover, our method is robust against white-box attacks since computing the gradients of whitening coloring transform is hard and has huge computational overhead. As well as this, we demonstrated the effectiveness of our model against several state-of-the-art black-box attacks.
The major drawback of our work is the use of nearest-neighbor algorithm in order to find a clean image from train data for refinement of deep layers. Other than computational overhead, nearestneighbor is an impractical approach for complex problems and datasets. As future work, we suggest solving the aforementioned issue by omitting either the need of clean image completely or finding an alternative to nearest-neighbor which can be applied to complex datasets as well.
